ems to be a distinction from the
other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason;
whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a
kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations. According
to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the
other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both
habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.

Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues,
according as they have their special determinate matter; each of its
own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general
condition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above (A.
3). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct
habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first
sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the
rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what
is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the
pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very
hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his
daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much
easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. Again,
temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing
into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened
by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very
great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught
of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be
inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by
cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing
himself to be unconquered by toil."

From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent
by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues
are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the
sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: These four ge