to her passions, he would continue: "I lost this eye in fighting under
Truxton, with the Insurgence; I got this scar before Tripoli; I broke
this leg on board the Constitution, when the Guerriere struck." * * * I
will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe to which he would be driven by
an abandonment of him to his oppressor. It will not be, it cannot be,
that his country will refuse him protection. * * *

An honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war. My plan would
be to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious
direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we
can reach the enemy, at sea or on land, and negotiate the terms of a
peace at Quebec or at Halifax. We are told that England is a proud and
lofty nation, which, disdaining to wait for danger, meets it half way.
Haughty as she is we triumphed over her once, and, if we do not listen
to the counsels of timidity and despair, we shall again prevail. In such
a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with
success; but, if we fail, let us fail like men, lash ourselves to our
gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for
FREE TRADE AND SEAMEN'S RIGHTS.

IV. -- THE RISE OF NATIONALITY.

In spite of execrable financial management, of the criminal blunders of
political army officers, and of consequent defeats on land, and quite
apart from brilliant sea-fights and the New Orleans victory, the war of
1812 was of incalculable benefit to the United States. It marks more
particularly the point at which the already established democracy began
to shade off into a real nationality.

The Democratic party began its career as a States-rights party.
Possession of national power had so far modified the practical operation
of its tenets that it had not hesitated to carry out a national policy,
and even wage a desperate war, in flat opposition to the will of one
section of the Union, comprising five of its most influential States;
and, when the Hartford Convention was suspected of a design to put the
New England opposition to the war into a forcible veto, there were many
indications that the dominant party was fully prepared to answer by a
forcible materialization of the national will. In the North and West, at
least, the old States-rights formulas never carried a real vitality
beyond the war of 1812. Men still spoke of "sovereign States," and
prided themselves on the differenc