real supremacy which marks the
first-class man.

How then is it possible to differentiate, to describe where and in what
manner this luck occurs?

Fortunately, this has been done for us in seven words by Seignelay, the
Minister of Marine to Louis Quatorze in 1692. Speaking of Admiral de
Tourville, who defeated the English and Dutch at the Battle of Beachy Head,
July 10th, 1690, Seignelay says of him that he was "poltron de tete mais
pas de coeur." The judgment was just: de Tourville, as recklessly gallant
as any French noble of them all, failed to live up to his responsibilities
two years later at the Battle of La Hogue. Mahan says: "The caution in his
pursuit of the Allies after Beachy Head, though so different in appearance,
came from the same trait which impelled him two years later to lead his
fleet to almost certain destruction at La Hogue because he had the King's
order in his pocket. He was brave enough to do anything, but not strong
enough to bear the heaviest burdens."

We see the application of this truth in the period which we are
considering; particularly is it borne in upon us in the case of the leaders
of the Ottoman Turks. Serving as they did a despot of unlimited powers,
failure in the success of his arms was apt to lead to the immediate and
violent death of the man in command. If, therefore, precise instructions
were issued, they were, as a rule, carried out to the letter; as in case of
defeat an effort could be made to shift responsibility on to the shoulders
of the Padishah. Failure owing to initiative was certain of prompt
retribution; success complete and absolute would be the only justification
for a departure from orders.

Far otherwise was it with the Sea-wolves, who were a law to themselves and
to themselves alone. Should they care "to place it on the hazard of a die
to win or lose it all," there was none to say them nay, there was no
punishment save that of defeat. This it was that so often conduced to their
success. Despots as were such men as Kheyr-ed-Din Barbarossa and Dragut,
they were none the less dependent on the goodwill of their followers. If,
therefore, they decided on a desperate enterprise, they appealed to the
fighting instincts, the cupidity, and the fanaticism of these men. Should
they succeed in gaining their good will for the attempt which they
meditated, then all was well with them, and behind them was no grim
sinister figure whose word was death and whose breath was destr