ed by
this report, fearing it might be true; but on mature consideration was
satisfied that it was only a political contrivance of the rajah, and
prudently advised the rajah to desist from the propagation of any such
false reports. He then assured the principal persons of Cochin that
their ships might safely proceed against Cuneale, yet recommended that
they should conduct themselves with much caution. All the fleet being
now united before the fort, it was found that Cuneale had drawn up a
line of armed galliots on the edge of the water under the wall of his
fort, in case of being attacked that way. It was resolved in a council
of war to force an entrance into the river, after which to draw up the
Portuguese vessels in a line with their bows to the shore, that they
might cover the debarkation of the troops for the purpose of assaulting
the fort. This proposition was transmitted to Goa and approved by the
viceroy, yet Don Luis was persuaded by some gentlemen who wished to
disgrace him, to attack on the side of _Ariole_, under pretence that the
passage of the bar might prove fatal. At this time the zamorin was
battering the walls of the town or _petah_, and desired that some
Portuguese might be sent to his assistance. Don Luis being suspicious,
demanded hostages for their safety, and accordingly six principal nayres
were sent, among whom were the rajahs of _Tanor, Chale_, and _Carnere_,
and the chief judge of Calicut. Don Luis then sent 300 Portuguese under
the command of Belchior Ferreyra.

By previous concert, a combined assault was to be made on the night of
the 3d of May, the troops of the zamorin attacking on the land side, and
the Portuguese on the sea front, at the same time, the signal for both
to commence at once being by means of a flaming lance. But Belchior
Calaca, who was appointed to give the signal, mistook the hour, and gave
it too soon, so that every thing fell into confusion. Immediately on
seeing the signal, Ferreyra, who commanded the Portuguese troops along
with the zamorin, fell on with his men and 5000 Nayres, but lost 28 of
his men at the first onset. Luis de Silva, who was appointed to lead the
van of the Portuguese sea attack with 600 men, though ready and
observing the concerted signal, did not move till past midnight, which
was the appointed hour, by which the enemy were left free to resist the
land attack with their forces undivided. At length when it was towards
morning, de Silva passed the c