and
last, but by no means least, Ataman Kalmakoff with about 400 Cossack
cavalry--a total of about 1,000 men. I ordered the two roads along which
any reinforcements for the enemy post must pass to be patrolled at night
and also closely observed during the day.

I had drawn up my plan of attack and the first stage of the operation
had actually been executed, when I was brought to a sudden standstill by
a piece of fussy interference.

There was no linguist in my battalion capable of speaking Russian
sufficiently well for my purpose, hence I had to seek the services of an
agent of the British Military Representative at "Vlady." This agent
returned to "Vlady" directly the necessary arrangements for the attack
had been completed. I ought to have compelled him to remain with me, but
as he appeared to favour the proposed forward movement I did not scent
any danger to my purely defensive policy. He did not wait until he had
reported to the Military Representative, but when only half way
telegraphed from Nikolsk warning me that in his opinion this forward
movement should not take place, as he had already received important
information which altered the entire situation. I ignored this
interference of an understraper, but a few hours later received definite
instructions from the Political Representative, that I was to stand
purely on the defensive, and not move an inch beyond my position. I was
compelled to accept the instruction, but was disgusted with the
decision. It proved to me in a forcible way what I had never realised
before, how impossible it is for a man at a distance, however clever he
may be, to decide a military problem, limited in locality and isolated,
as was this case, from questions of public policy. When the one purpose
of a force is the protection or maintenance of a limited front, only the
man on the spot can be the judge of what is necessary to accomplish that
purpose.

My actual plan of operations was very simple. Having assembled my force
at Olhanka, I should at dusk have occupied the roads leading from
Shmakovka to Uspenkie, and from Uspenkie to the monastery by cavalry,
thus making it impossible for enemy reinforcements to reach the post to
be attacked under the cover of night. My own troops, together with the
Czech company, would have approached the position from the south, and
during the hours of darkness have taken up a line within rifle- and
machine-gun range. At daybreak fire would have been open