r in my battalion had the slightest inkling
of the position. Then the tune changed. Would I defend the Ministers who
were still in session if they were attacked? My answer was that any
political refugee who sought asylum in my lines would be protected, but
he must give up every idea of again taking any part in Russian affairs.
"But what would you do if the Russian troops revolted and sought to
murder those who had come into your lines. Would you give them up?"
"Never!" "What if the Czech commanders made the demand?" "Still never;
besides which the Czechs are too honourable ever to make a demand such
as no soldier could accept." The last question was the most important of
all, and was doubtless the kernel of the whole series, the others being
mere camouflage.

The Czechs had just inaugurated their National Republican Government,
and were naturally obsessed with the usual "Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity" business, and could not be expected to view the
establishment of a Dictatorship within their sphere of operations with
entire unconcern or without serious misgivings. The hostile attitude of
the Russian branch of their National Council at Ekaterinburg and
Chilliyabinsk, directly they heard of Koltchak's acceptance of the
supreme authority, is proof of the danger which might evolve from that
quarter.

The Council of Ministers, and perhaps Koltchak himself, were unable to
take the final plunge until they had a thorough understanding of the
British attitude. The position of the Czech forces at Omsk made it
impossible for them to approach the place where the Ministers were in
session without passing the British, and my machine guns commanded every
avenue leading to or from the Russian Headquarters.

Things were now in such a state of tension that for the safety of my
command I informed both the Russian and Czech authorities that I should
not allow bodies of troops or citizens either to approach or collect
near my cantonment; that such approach or collection would be treated as
hostile, and dealt with accordingly. That these arrangements gave the
Ministers greater confidence to proceed with their policy I have no
doubt. That was one of the inevitable consequences of the preparations
for our own defence, but not the inspiration of their policy, which was
entirely their own; but it did steady the situation.

I place these facts on record that those who are interested may be able
to give them their proper order of value an