discovering an issue which would prevent complications'.[68] The
proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian
Governments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow,
on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal,
and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to impress its real
character upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr von Jagow, on receipt
of the proposal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen,
that the conference suggested

'would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in
his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and
Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it.'

Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that

'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that
representatives of the four nations not directly interested should
discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation'.[69]

Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian
Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. Some
doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the
German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for peace; but,
giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection
must be to the 'form of the proposal'. 'Perhaps', added Sir Edward
Goschen, 'he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would
find it possible to work with us.'[70] The next day the same idea was
pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:--

'The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be
put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine
was not acceptable.'[71]

But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then gone
so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country.

With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediation
acceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the first
period of the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility of
rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might have
preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany.
The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr.
von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory and
sympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] cont