nceivably have been
absent from it; and its character, as well as its existence, is a mere
datum of sense.

The pleasure that belongs to the consciousness of relations is
therefore as immediate as any other; indeed, our emotional
consciousness is always single, but we treat it as a resultant of
many and even of conflicting feelings because we look at it
historically with a view to comprehending it, and distribute it into
as many factors as we find objects or causes to which to attribute it.
The pleasure of association is an immediate feeling, which we
account for by its relation to a feeling in the past, or to cerebral
structure modified by a former experience; just as memory itself,
which we explain by a reference to the past, is a peculiar
complication of present consciousness.

_Kinds of value in the second term._

Sec. 50. These reflections may make less surprising to us what is the
most striking fact about the philosophy of expression; namely, that
the value acquired by the expressive thing is often of an entirely
different kind from that which the thing expressed possesses. The
expression of physical pleasure, of passion, or even of pain, may
constitute beauty and please the beholder. Thus the value of the
second term may be physical, or practical, or even negative; and it
may be transmuted, as it passes to the first term, into a value at
once positive and aesthetic. The transformation of practical values
into aesthetic has often been noted, and has even led to the theory
that beauty is utility seen at arm's length; a premonition of pleasure
and prosperity, much as smell is a premonition of taste. The
transformation of negative values into positive has naturally
attracted even more attention, and given rise to various theories of
the comic, tragic, and sublime. For these three species of aesthetic
good seem to please us by the suggestion of evil; and the problem
arises how a mind can be made happier by having suggestions of
unhappiness stirred within it; an unhappiness it cannot understand
without in some degree sharing in it. We must now turn to the
analysis of this question.

The expressiveness of a smile is not discovered exactly through
association of images. The child smiles (without knowing it) when
he feels pleasure; and the nurse smiles back; his own pleasure is
associated with her conduct, and her smile is therefore expressive
of pleasure. The fact of his pleasure at her smile is the ground of
his