f Austria, purposely refrained from examining _the text_ of the
communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not
responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the
discreditable character of this iniquitous conspiracy against the
peace of Europe,--yet the more reasonable assumption is that the
simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's
warning to the Powers was the result of a concerted action and had
a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary
inferences of human life, would question this conclusion.

The communication from the German Foreign Office last referred
to anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these
demands"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests
to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such
noncompliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that
"the choice of means must be left to it."

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

to lay particular stress on the view that the above question
is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon
Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the Powers should
earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,

and the instruction added that Germany strongly desired

that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of
another Power, on account of the various alliance
obligations, _would bring consequences impossible to
measure_.

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole
correspondence. If the German Foreign Office were as ignorant as its
Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and
ultimatum, and if Germany were not then instigating and supporting
Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have
served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that
Austria "_must_" be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any
attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring
consequences impossible to measure"?[12]

[Footnote 12: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]

A still more important piece of evidence is the carefully prepared
confidential communication, which the Imperial Chancellor sent to the
Federated Governments of Germany shortly after the Servian reply was
given.

In this confidential communication, which was nothing less than a call
to arms to the entire German Empir