is the necessary point of departure of the
human understanding; the third is its fixed and definite state. The
second is merely a state of transition.

In order for a man who has reached the scientific stage in his
intellectual development to make anything out of the reasonings of those
who are still in the stage of theological childhood or in that of
metaphysical adolescence, it is necessary for him to use their
insubstantialities as symbols of his substantialities.

The only difference that I can see between a theologian and a
metaphysician is that, whereas the former personifies a generality
which is the creation of his imagination, calling it a god, the latter
objectifies a particularity which is the creation of his imagination
calling it an entity; but all such personifications and objectifications
(gods, things-in-themselves, vital entities, souls) are alike
fictitious, because the childish theologians and metaphysicians proceed
on the basis of philosophically assumed realities, not on scientifically
established facts which pave the way on which an adult proceeds.

Comte analyzes the difference between the intellectuality of theological
children, metaphysical youths and scientific adults as follows:

In the theological state, the human mind, seeking the essential
nature of beings, the first and final causes (the origin and
purpose) of all effects--in short, absolute knowledge--supposes all
phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural
beings.

In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the
first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract
forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstractions)
inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena.
What is called the explanation of phenomena is, in this stage, a
mere reference of each to its proper entity.

In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain
search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the
universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the
study of their laws--that is, their invariable relations of
succession and resemblance. Reasoning and observation, duly
combined, are the means of this knowledge. What is now understood
when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the
establishment of a connection between single phenomen