to band together
to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of
Nature and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot
carry on their pursuits. But if this very man had been shown something
which as a scientist he might _do_ with telepathy, he might not only
have examined the evidence, but even have found it good enough. This
very law which the logicians would impose upon us--if I may give the
name of logicians to those who would rule out our willing nature
here--is based on nothing but their own natural wish to exclude all
elements for {11} which they, in their professional quality of
logicians, can find no use.

Evidently, then, our non-intellectual nature does influence our
convictions. There are passional tendencies and volitions which run
before and others which come after belief, and it is only the latter
that are too late for the fair; and they are not too late when the
previous passional work has been already in their own direction.
Pascal's argument, instead of being powerless, then seems a regular
clincher, and is the last stroke needed to make our faith in masses and
holy water complete. The state of things is evidently far from simple;
and pure insight and logic, whatever they might do ideally, are not the
only things that really do produce our creeds.

IV.

Our next duty, having recognized this mixed-up state of affairs, is to
ask whether it be simply reprehensible and pathological, or whether, on
the contrary, we must treat it as a normal element in making up our
minds. The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: _Our passional
nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature
be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such
circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself
a passional decision,--just like deciding yes or no,--and is attended
with the same risk of losing the truth_. The thesis thus abstractly
expressed will, I trust, soon become quite clear. But I must first
indulge in a bit more of preliminary work.

{12}

V.

It will be observed that for the purposes of this discussion we are on
'dogmatic' ground,--ground, I mean, which leaves systematic
philosophical scepticism altogether out of account. The postulate that
there is truth, and that it is the destiny of our minds to attain it,
we are deliberately resolving to mak