submitted forthwith to the
delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually
proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on
the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so
much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in
the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria
convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of
accepting the British terms, each of them was anxious, individually,
to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the
surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible
from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour
should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the
question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the
delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the
Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted
discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the
afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the
limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long
debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke
more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments
used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering
that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he
said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of
indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be
continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the
form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the
substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice
the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From
this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words
of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute--for every man was
preparing himself for the bitter end--they came to an agreement." Then
a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and empowering the
commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6
votes.

[Footnote 341: The minutes of the final meetings of the
commando representatives--as also those of the earlier
meetings of May 15th to 17th--have been published by General
Christian de Wet in _The Three Ye