ion
of German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, the more certain did I feel
that the key to that situation (as M. Sazonoff said later) lay in
Berlin, and that there was no need to look further for the solution of
the problem. If, however, the choice between peace and war was left to
the discretion of the Emperor William, whose influence over his ally in
Vienna had always overruled that of others, then, considering what I
knew as to His Majesty's personal inclinations and the plans of the
General Staff, the upshot of it all was no longer in doubt, and no hope
of a peaceful arrangement could any longer be entertained. I
communicated this dismal forecast to the French Ambassador, whom I went
to see on the evening of the 25th. Like myself, M. Cambon laboured under
no illusions. That very night I wrote to my Government, in order to
acquaint it with my fears and urge it to be on its guard. This report,
dated the 26th, I entrusted, as a measure of precaution, to one of my
secretaries, who at once left for Brussels. Early next morning, my
dispatch was in the hands of the Belgian Foreign Minister.

[Sidenote: War aimed at Russia and France.]

The ultimatum to Serbia [it ran] is a blow contrived by Vienna and
Berlin, or rather, contrived here and carried out at Vienna. Requital
for the assassination of the Austrian heir apparent and the Pan-Serb
propaganda serves as a stalking-horse. The real aim, apart from the
crushing of Serbia and the stifling of Jugo-Slav aspirations, is to deal
a deadly thrust at Russia and France, with the hope that England will
stand aside from the struggle. In order to vindicate this theory, I beg
to remind you of the view prevailing in the German General Staff,
namely, that a war with France and Russia is unavoidable and close at
hand--a view which the Emperor has been induced to share. This war,
eagerly desired by the military and Pan-German party, might be
undertaken to-day under conditions extremely favourable for Germany,
conditions that are not likely to arise again for some time to come.

After a summary of the situation and of the problems that it raised, my
report concluded as follows:

We, too, have to ask ourselves these harassing
questions, and keep ourselves ready for the
worst; for the European conflict that has
always been talked about, with the hope that it
would never break out, is to-day becoming a
grim reality.

[Sidenote: Dangers fo