de by the Pasitch Cabinet, concessions that had
not been anticipated abroad, failed to impress Germany. She persisted in
seeing only with Austria's eyes.

[Sidenote: Zimmermann's arguments.]

Herr Zimmermann's arguments held solely on the hypothesis that, in the
action brought by Austria against Serbia, no Power had the right to
come forward as counsel for the defendant, or to interfere in the trial
at all. This claim amounted to depriving Russia of her historic role in
the Balkans. Carried to its logical conclusion, the theory meant
condemning unheard every small State that should be unfortunate enough
to have a dispute with a great Power. According to the principles of the
Berlin Cabinet, the great Power should be allowed, without let or
hindrance, to proceed to the execution of its weak opponent. England,
therefore, would have had no right to succor Belgium when the latter was
invaded by Germany, any more than Russia had a right to protect Serbia
from the Austrian menace.

Russia, it was asserted at the Wilhelmstrasse, ought to be satisfied
with the assurance that Austria would not impair the territorial
integrity of Serbia or mar her future existence as an independent State.
What a hollow mockery such a promise would seem, when the whole country
had been ravaged by fire and sword! Surely it was decreed that, after
this "exemplary punishment," Serbia should become the lowly vassal of
her redoubtable neighbour, living a life that was no life, cowed by the
jealous eye of the Austrian Minister--really the Austrian Viceroy--at
Belgrade. Had not Count Mensdorff declared to Sir Edward Grey that
before the Balkan War Serbia was regarded as gravitating towards the
Dual Monarchy's sphere of influence? A return to the past, to the tame
deference of King Milan, was the least that Austria would exact.

[Sidenote: German opinion is misled.]

The version given out by the Imperial Chancellery, besides being
intended to enlighten foreign Governments, had a further end in view.
Repeated _ad nauseam_ by the Press, it aimed at misleading German
public opinion. From the very opening of the crisis, Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg and his colleagues strove, with all the ingenuity at
their command, to hoodwink their countrymen, to shuffle the cards, to
throw beforehand on Russia, in case the situation should grow worse, the
odium of provocation and the blame for the disaster, to represent that
Power as meddling with a police inquiry that di