, the
firing died away into a continuous but desultory rifle-fire, with an
occasional dropping shell from the guns. Under cover of dark, I tried
to guard the drift and dead ground to the south of it, by men standing
up and firing at that level, but towards midnight I was forced to
withdraw them into the trenches, after several casualties, as the
enemy then apparently woke up and kept up a furious rifle-fire upon us
for over an hour. During this time the guns went through some
mysterious evolutions. At first we got it very hot from the north,
where the guns had been all along. Then suddenly a gun was opened on
us away from the southwest, and we were shelled for a short time from
both sides. After a little the shelling on the north ceased, and
continued from the southwest only for twenty minutes. After this the
guns ceased, and the rifle-fire also gradually died away.

When day dawned not a living soul was to be seen; there were the dead
men, horses, and the deserted wagons. I feared a trap, but gradually
came to the conclusion the Boers had retired. After a little we
discovered the river-bed was deserted as well, but the Boers had not
retired. They had discovered the dead ground, and under the mutually
supporting fire of their guns, which had kept us to our trenches, had
all _crossed the drift_ and trekked south.

True, we were not captured, and had very few losses, and had severely
mauled the enemy, _but_ they had crossed the drift. It must have
evidently been of great importance to them to go on, or they would
have attempted to capture us, as they were about 500 to our 50.

I had failed in my duty.

During the next few hours we buried the dead, tended the wounded, and
took some well-earned rest, and I had ample leisure to consider my
failure and the causes. The lessons I derived from the fight were:

20. Beware of convex hills and _dead ground_. Especially take care to
have some place where the enemy _must_ come under your fire. Choose
the exact position of your firing-trenches, with your eye at the level
of the men who will eventually use them.

21. A hill may not, after all, though it has "command," be the best
place to hold necessarily.

22. A conspicuous "bluff" trench may cause the enemy to waste much
ammunition, and draw fire away from the actual defences.

In addition to these lessons, another little matter on my mind was
what my colonel would say at my failure.

Lying on my back, looking up at the sk