conviction that, if any troops in the world
had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous
and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have
stood firm.

THE CANADIANS' PART

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left dangerously
exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a
prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the
Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the
East.

In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held
their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage; and
it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these
splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with
the most serious consequences.

They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the
divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting
in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective
counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with
the French right, and a new line was formed.

The 2d London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian
Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division, and,
being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was
recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns
could not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian
Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of
Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer
Commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from
the 3d Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet
eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in
capturing the bridge at Steenstraate and some works south of Lizerne,
all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres
Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a
wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed,
therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used
to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in
preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about ten o'clock on the morning of th