e interests of the people. They could also summon the Senate, and
bring proposals before it. Meanwhile their persons were "sacrosanct,"
or inviolable, during their term of office. Here lay the opportunity.
The emperor was invested by the Senate with these "powers of the
tribune." He was not actually elected a tribune, for the office was
only annual and could not be held along with any other, whereas the
emperor must have the prerogatives always, and in conjunction with any
other functions which he might choose to hold. He, therefore, only
received the corresponding "powers" and privileges. This position
enabled him to veto a measure whenever he chose, and with impunity.
Naturally therefore it became the custom, as far as possible, to find
out his wishes beforehand, and to move accordingly. He could also, in
the same right, summon the Senate and bring measures, or get them
brought, before it. To make certainty doubly certain, he was granted
the right to what we should call "the first business on the
notice-paper."

Observe further the shrewdness of the first emperor, Augustus, when he
selected this particular position. The "tribunes of the commons" were
constitutionally popular champions; they represented the interests of
the common people. By assuming a position similar to theirs, the
emperor--or commander-in-chief--made it appear to the common people
that he was their chief and perpetual representative, and that their
interests were bound up with his authority. He took them under his
wing, and saw, among other things, that they did not starve or go
stinted of amusements. He saw to it that they had corn for their
bread, plenty of water, and games in the circus. His "bread and games"
kept them quiet.

Supported by the army on one side, with his person secure, enjoying
the right of initiative and the right of veto, this officer of the
"commonwealth" became indeed the Colossus who bestrode the Roman
world. He was invariably made also the Pontifex Maximus, or chief
guardian of the religious interests of Rome. He might in addition
receive other constitutional appointments--for example, that of
supervisor or corrector of morals--whenever these might suit a special
purpose. What more could a man desire, if he was satisfied to forego
the name of autocrat so long as he possessed the substance? It was
quite as much to the purpose to be called _Princeps_, or "head of the
state," as to be called a king, like the Parthian or other