earthworks
does not appeal as an effective barrier to the civilian mind, and
above Point of Rocks the great river was easy of passage. Even if
Washington were absolutely safe from a coup de main, Lincoln had
still good reason for apprehension. The Union capital was merely the
seat of government. It had no commercial interests. With a population
of but 20,000, it was of no more practical importance than Windsor or
Versailles. Compared with New York, Pittsburg, or Philadelphia, it
was little more than a village. But, in the regard of the Northern
people, Washington was the centre of the Union, the keystone of the
national existence. The Capitol, the White House, the Treasury, were
symbols as sacred to the States as the colours to a regiment.* (* For
an interesting exposition of the views of the soldiers at Washington,
see evidence of General Hitchcock, U.S.A., acting as Military Adviser
to the President, O.R. volume 12 part 1 page 221.) If the nation was
set upon the fall of Richmond, it was at least as solicitous for the
security of its own chief city, and an administration that permitted
that security to be endangered would have been compelled to bow to
the popular clamour. The extraordinary taxation demanded by the war
already pressed heavily on the people. Stocks were falling rapidly,
and the financial situation was almost critical. It is probable, too,
that a blow at Washington would have done more than destroy all
confidence in the Government. England and France were chafing under
the effects of the blockade. The marts of Europe were hungry for
cotton. There was much sympathy beyond seas with the seceded States;
and, should Washington fall, the South, in all likelihood, would be
recognised as an independent nation. Even if the Great Powers were to
refuse her active aid in the shape of fleets and armies, she would at
least have access to the money markets of the world; and it was
possible that neither England nor France would endure the closing of
her ports. With the breaking of the blockade, money, munitions, and
perhaps recruits, would be poured into the Confederacy, and the
difficulty of reconquest would be trebled. The dread of foreign
interference was, therefore, very real; and Lincoln, foreseeing the
panic that would shake the nation should a Confederate army cross the
Potomac at Harper's Ferry or Point of Rocks, was quite justified in
insisting on the security of Washington being placed beyond a doubt.
He kne