age: 17 years of age; universal

Executive branch:
chief of state: KIM Chong-il, is the son of and designated successor
to former President KIM Il-song (who died 8 July 1994); formal
succession has not yet taken place (January 1995); election last held
24 May 1990 (next to be held by NA); results - President KIM Il-song
was reelected without opposition
head of government: Premier KANG Song-san (since December 1992)
cabinet: State Administration Council; appointed by the Supreme
People's Assembly

Legislative branch: unicameral
Supreme People's Assembly (Ch'oego Inmin Hoeui): elections last held
on 7-9 April 1990 (next to be held NA); results - percent of vote by
party NA; seats - (687 total) the KWP approves a single list of
candidates who are elected without opposition; minor parties hold a
few seats

Judicial branch: Central Court

Political parties and leaders: major party - Korean Workers' Party
(KWP), KIM Chong-il, secretary, Central Committee; Korean Social
Democratic Party, KIM Pyong-sik, chairman; Chondoist Chongu Party, YU
Mi-yong, chairwoman

Member of: ESCAP, FAO, G-77, ICAO, IFAD, IFRCS, IMO, INTELSAT
(nonsignatory user), IOC, ISO, ITU, NAM, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO,
UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO

Diplomatic representation in US: none

US diplomatic representation: none

Flag: three horizontal bands of blue (top), red (triple width), and
blue; the red band is edged in white; on the hoist side of the red
band is a white disk with a red five-pointed star

@Korea, North:Economy

Overview: More than 90% of this command economy is socialized;
agricultural land is collectivized; and state-owned industry produces
95% of manufactured goods. State control of economic affairs is
unusually tight even for a Communist country because of the small size
and homogeneity of the society and the strict rule of KIM Il-song in
the past and now his son, KIM Chong-il. Economic growth during the
period 1984-88 averaged 2%-3%, but output declined by 3%-5% annually
during 1989-92 because of systemic problems and disruptions in
socialist-style economic relations with the former USSR and China. In
1992, output dropped sharply, by perhaps 7%-9%, as the economy felt
the cumulative effect of the reduction in outside support. The
leadership insisted on maintaining its high level of military outlays
from a shrinking economic pie. Moreover, a serious drawdown in
inventories and crit