the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a
Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to
imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically
declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too
many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was
intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the
Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty
with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as
previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first
be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible
agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would
take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that
if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then
proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign
affairs.

[Sidenote: _The revolutionary basis of the proposal._]

The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being
revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian
resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards
the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without
consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of
Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly
unreasonable.

To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, _to take a
revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the
Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union_, far
more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the
background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be
shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the
interests of Norway, and had denied Norway's Sovereign rights; then he
should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of
the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The
King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said
'No', "it cannot", Mr NANSEN says, "be the result of Norwegian influence,
_but on account of Swedish pressure_"[56:1]. Here we are met by the
dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which
the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of the