'there must be some foundation for ideas
so generally adopted by all nations. Should not one distrust opinions
and arguments which overturn that which, until now, has been held as
settled; that which is held as certain by so many persons whose
intelligence and motives make them trustworthy?'"

We confess this argument should make a profound impression, and ought
to throw doubt on the most incontestable points, if we had not seen,
one after another, opinions the most false, now generally acknowledged
to be such, received and professed by all the world during a long
succession of centuries. It is not very long since all nations, from
the most rude to the most enlightened, and all men, from the
street-porter to the most learned philosopher, believed in the four
elements. Nobody had thought of contesting this doctrine, which is,
however, false; so much so, that at this day any mere naturalist's
assistant, who should consider earth, water, and fire, elements, would
disgrace himself.

On which our opponents make this observation: "If you suppose you have
thus answered the very forcible objection you have proposed to
yourselves, you deceive yourselves strangely. Suppose that men,
otherwise intelligent, should be mistaken on any point whatever of
natural history for many centuries, that would signify or prove
nothing. Would water, air, earth, fire, be less useful to man whether
they were or were not elements? Such errors are of no consequence;
they lead to no revolutions, do not unsettle the mind; above all, they
injure no interests, so they might, without inconvenience, endure for
millions of years. The physical world would progress just as if they
did not exist. Would it be thus with errors which attack the moral
world? Can we conceive that a system of government, absolutely false,
consequently injurious, could be carried out through many centuries,
among many nations, with the general consent of educated men? Can we
explain how such a system could be reconciled with the ever-increasing
prosperity of nations? You acknowledge that the argument you combat
ought to make a profound impression. Yes, truly, and this impression
remains, for you have rather strengthened than destroyed it."

Or again, they say: "It was only in the middle of the last century,
the eighteenth century, in which all subjects, all principles, without
exception, were delivered up to public discussion, that these
furnishers of speculative ideas which are