life and new to politics and
politicians, saw the reason and the necessity of reform. The hero of a
victorious war, at the height of his popularity, his party in undisputed
and seemingly indisputable supremacy, made the attempt. Congress,
good-naturedly tolerating what it considered his whim of inexperience,
granted money to try an experiment. The adverse pressure was tremendous.
"I am used to pressure," said the soldier. So he was, but not to this
pressure. He was driven by unknown and incalculable currents. He was
enveloped in whirlwinds of sophistry, scorn, and incredulity. He who
upon his own line had fought it out all summer to victory, upon a line
absolutely new and unknown was naturally bewildered and dismayed. So
Wellington had drawn the lines of victory on the Spanish Peninsula and
had saved Europe at Waterloo. But even Wellington at Waterloo could
not be also Sir Robert Peel at Westminster. Even Wellington, who had
overthrown Napoleon in the field, could not also be the parliamentary
hero who for the welfare of his country would dare to risk the overthrow
of his party.

When at last President Grant said, "If Congress adjourns without
positive legislation on Civil Service reform, I shall regard such action
as a disapproval of the system and shall abandon it," it was, indeed,
a surrender, but it was the surrender of a champion who had honestly
mistaken both the nature and the strength of the adversary and his own
power of endurance.

It is not, then, reasonable, under the conditions of our Government and
in the actual situation, to expect a President to go much faster or
much further than public opinion. But executive action can aid most
effectively the development and movement of that opinion, and the most
decisive reform measures that the present administration might take
would be undoubtedly supported by a powerful public sentiment. The
educative results of resolute executive action, however limited and
incomplete in scope, have been shown in the two great public offices
of which I have spoken, the New York custom-house and the New York
post-office. For nearly three years the entire practicability of reform
has been demonstrated in those offices, and solely by the direction of
the President. The value of such demonstrations, due to the Executive
will alone, carried into effect by thoroughly trained and interested
subordinates, cannot be overestimated. But when they depend upon the
will of a transient office