established like a high crime
and misdemeanor. Thus every clerk in every office would have a kind of
vested interest in his place because, however careless, slovenly, or
troublesome he might be, he could be displaced only by an elaborate
and doubtful legal process. Moreover, if the head of a bureau or
a collector, or a postmaster were obliged to prove negligence, or
insolence, or incompetency against a clerk as he would prove theft,
there would be no removals from the public service except for crimes
of which the penal law takes cognizance. Consequently, removal would be
always and justly regarded as a stigma upon character, and a man removed
from a position in a public office would be virtually branded as a
convicted criminal. Removal for cause, therefore, if the cause were
to be decided by any authority but that of the responsible superior
officer, instead of improving, would swiftly and enormously enhance
the cost, and ruin the efficiency, of the public service, by destroying
subordination, and making every lazy and worthless member of it twice as
careless and incompetent as he is now.

If, then, the legitimate cause for removal ought to be determined in
public as in private business by the responsible appointing power, it is
of the highest public necessity that the exercise of that power should
be made as absolutely honest and independent as possible. But how can
it be made honest and independent if it is not protected so far as
practicable from the constant bribery of selfish interest and the
illicit solicitation of personal influence? The experience of our large
patronage offices proves conclusively that the cause of the larger
number of removals is not dishonesty or incompetency; it is the desire
to make vacancies to fill. This is the actual cause, whatever cause may
be assigned. The removals would not be made except for the pressure of
politicians. But those politicians would not press for removals if they
could not secure the appointment of their favorites. Make it impossible
for them to secure appointment, and the pressure would instantly
disappear and arbitrary removal cease.

So long, therefore, as we permit minor appointments to be made by mere
personal influence and favor, a fixed limited term and removal during
that term for cause only would not remedy the evil, because the
incumbents would still be seeking influence to secure re-appointment,
and the aspirants doing the same to replace them. Removal und