uted an elected Assembly, and praying that the various wants
brought forward might meet with favourable consideration. In all, the
Assembly, inclusive of the preliminary meetings of the representatives,
sat for eight days, and though there was much earnestness in discussion,
and much difference of opinion, not a single case of an exhibition of ill
feeling occurred, with the exception, as we have seen, of the occasion
when the marriage question was brought forward, though that may be called
an exhibition of warm and excited feeling rather than ill feeling.

As the reader will remember, the representatives have no power whatever,
except, and a very important exception it of course is, of ventilating in
public, and in the presence of the Dewan and the leading officers of
State, whatever grievances and wants they may desire to call attention to,
and the machinery for this ventilation is now so complete that the
requirements even of those inhabiting the most inaccessible corners of
the province can be readily made known to the Government. And now this
question naturally arises. When, if ever, is it probable that this
Assembly will demand for itself some direct power of controlling, or
directing the Government? As far as I could see at the time, or can see
now, the Assembly is never likely to ask for any power whatever, and I
confess that I was much struck with the fact that, though I had many
private conversations relating to the Assembly, both with natives and
Europeans, I never expressed myself, nor did I ever hear anyone express, a
desire that the Assembly should have any power. But after a little
reflection, the explanation of the absence of any such demand seems to be
extremely obvious, for if we look into the history of all parliamentary
institutions such as we have, we shall find that they have arisen
primarily from misgovernment, and I say primarily because such
institutions in the United States and in our colonies are merely
inheritances from the forefathers of the English founders of these
countries. The insuperable difficulty, then, in the way of those who
desire to create parliamentary institutions in India is, that there is no
misgovernment on which to start them, and that is why the Indian National
(so called, for there is nothing really national about it) Congress have
found it advisable, as a preliminary step, to try and persuade the people,
with the aid of lying and seditious pamphlets, that they are misgovern