art of a prince's territories; and yet that
the same party may not, when residing in the nation, refuse to
acknowledge the lawfulness of an anti-scriptural power. This is to say,
that people are no longer obliged to submit to authority, than they are
in capacity to withdraw from, or withdraw part of their prince's
territories from him, and so to justify their rebellion, by that which
can only be a terrible aggravation of their sin. These, with a number of
other absurdities, natively flow from a denial of the distinction
between the providential and preceptive will of God, making the title of
the lawful magistrate depend solely upon the will of the people. Nothing
is more evident than this, that if the inclinations of the people,
exclusive of all other qualifications, constitute a lawful magistrate,
then (though he rules ever so agreeable to God's preceptive will), so
soon as this body (though in a most unjust and tyrannical manner) casts
him off, he that moment for ever loses all title and claim to the
office, and can no longer be regarded as a lawful magistrate. A
principle that in its nature and tendency is introductive of all anarchy
and confusion, and with the greatest propriety deserves the encomium of
the _anti-government scheme_.
7. This anarchical system of principles, which destroys the above just
and necessary distinction, is directly in opposition to the laudable and
almost universal practice of all nations, in ordaining and enacting
certain fundamental laws, constitutions and provisos, whereby the throne
is fenced, the way to it limited, and the property thereof predisposed.
The Scripture sufficiently discovers those restrictions and rules, which
God himself has prescribed and laid down, for directing and determining
of his people's procedure about the erection of magistrates. And profane
history abounds in discovering certain fundamental laws and conditions
to take place, almost in every nation, without conforming to which, none
can be admitted to that dignity over them. But to what purpose are any
such laws and constitutions, if this vague principle is once admitted,
which cancels and disannuls all such provisos and acts? Why should
_Moses_ have been so solicitous about his successor in the government of
_Israel, Numb._ xxvii, 15-17, if God had ordained the inclinations of
the people alone should determine? Or to what purpose did _Israel_,
after the death of _Joshua_, ask of God, who should be their leader
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