FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46  
47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69   70   71   >>   >|  
But he went on to argue that sense-data were the only things of whose existence our perceptions could assure us; and that to be known is to be 'in' a mind, and therefore to be mental. Hence he concluded that nothing can ever be known except what is in some mind, and that whatever is known without being in my mind must be in some other mind. In order to understand his argument, it is necessary to understand his use of the word 'idea'. He gives the name 'idea' to anything which is _immediately_ known, as, for example, sense-data are known. Thus a particular colour which we see is an idea; so is a voice which we hear, and so on. But the term is not wholly confined to sense-data. There will also be things remembered or imagined, for with such things also we have immediate acquaintance at the moment of remembering or imagining. All such immediate data he calls 'ideas'. He then proceeds to consider common objects, such as a tree, for instance. He shows that all we know immediately when we 'perceive' the tree consists of ideas in his sense of the word, and he argues that there is not the slightest ground for supposing that there is anything real about the tree except what is perceived. Its being, he says, consists in being perceived: in the Latin of the schoolmen its '_esse_' is '_percipi_'. He fully admits that the tree must continue to exist even when we shut our eyes or when no human being is near it. But this continued existence, he says, is due to the fact that God continues to perceive it; the 'real' tree, which corresponds to what we called the physical object, consists of ideas in the mind of God, ideas more or less like those we have when we see the tree, but differing in the fact that they are permanent in God's mind so long as the tree continues to exist. All our perceptions, according to him, consist in a partial participation in God's perceptions, and it is because of this participation that different people see more or less the same tree. Thus apart from minds and their ideas there is nothing in the world, nor is it possible that anything else should ever be known, since whatever is known is necessarily an idea. There are in this argument a good many fallacies which have been important in the history of philosophy, and which it will be as well to bring to light. In the first place, there is a confusion engendered by the use of the word 'idea'. We think of an idea as essentially something in somebody's mind,
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46  
47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69   70   71   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

consists

 

perceptions

 

things

 
perceive
 

participation

 

existence

 

continues

 
perceived
 

argument

 

understand


immediately

 

permanent

 
physical
 

called

 

continued

 
corresponds
 

object

 

essentially

 

differing

 

necessarily


important
 

history

 
fallacies
 

confusion

 

engendered

 

people

 

philosophy

 

partial

 
consist
 

colour


remembered
 

imagined

 

confined

 

wholly

 
assure
 

concluded

 

mental

 

acquaintance

 
schoolmen
 

ground


supposing

 

continue

 

admits

 

percipi

 
slightest
 

argues

 

imagining

 

remembering

 
moment
 

proceeds