Utica; McClernand and Sherman
remained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Sherman
to Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The 11th, McClernand
was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advanced
from Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at
Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle.

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburg
could have been approached and besieged by the south side. It is not
probable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a close
besiegement. The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to
hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the
Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. It
was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and
approach from that direction. Accordingly, McPherson's troops that had
crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson
commenced.

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads
generally confined to the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one
(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel
to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. McClernand's
corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the
crossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with
the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand and
Sherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman,
extending to Raymond. The cavalry was used in this advance in
reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the
most practicable routes from one command to another so they could
support each other in case of an attack. In making this move I
estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen
thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson. It
would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at
one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him
in detail. This was done with success, but I found afterwards that I
had entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength.

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition.
My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad
and about seven miles south of it. The right was at Raymond eighteen
mi