as the candidate of their party for the
Presidency. Something had to be done to neutralize his growing
popularity. He could not be relieved from duty in the field where all
his battles had been victories: the design would have been too
transparent. It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico in
chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan:
that is, capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the country.
It was no doubt supposed that Scott's ambition would lead him to
slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet it
was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure
the prize.

The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. It
was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful
issue, or the political object would be unattained. Yet all the capable
officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man
selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a
prominent candidate for the Presidency. It was necessary to destroy his
chances promptly. The problem was to do this without the loss of
conquest and without permitting another general of the same political
party to acquire like popularity. The fact is, the administration of
Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace Scott, or, to speak more
correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace
himself.

General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande,
Matamoras and Saltillo from the first. Now that he was in command of
all the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his regular
troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the
line then in possession of the invading army. Indeed Scott did not deem
it important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorized
Taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. General Taylor protested
against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon
Buena Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief
in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande.

Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to
capture Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two
hundred and sixty miles in the interior. He was promised all he asked
and seemed to have not only the confidence of the President, but his
sincere good wishes. The promises were all