ot counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons
for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten
thousand strong. This force was composed of three divisions, under
Generals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of escaping the
vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got
together to move a division the advance was commenced. On the 8th of
April, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa. He was followed very soon
by Patterson, with his division. General Worth was to bring up the rear
with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry
six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp
and garrison equipage. It was the 13th of April before this division
left Vera Cruz.

The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some fifty
miles west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio,
about three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson reached
Plan del Rio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived. The two were
then secure against an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexican
forces. At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements
and without molestation, until the 18th of April. General Scott had
remained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the
12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take
personal supervision. He at once commenced his preparations for the
capture of the position held by Santa Anna and of the troops holding it.

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to
fifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point as
the easiest to defend against an invading army. The road, said to have
been built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended
at every turn by artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountain
walls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility. A flank
movement seemed equally impossible. After the arrival of the
commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to
find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be
reached without a front attack. These reconnoissances were made under
the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G.
T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B.
McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all office