very part of the colony may be
attended to, it will be found best to divide the
whole into convenient parts, each part sending its
proper number; and that the _elected_ might never
form to themselves an interest separate from the
_electors_, prudence will point out the propriety
of having elections often; because, as the
_elected_ might by that means return and mix again
with the general body of the _electors_, in a few
months their fidelity to the public will be
secured by the prudent reflection of making a rod
for themselves. And as this frequent interchange
will establish a common interest with every part
of the community, they will mutually and naturally
support each other, and on this (not on the
unmeaning name of king) depends the _strength of
government and the happiness of the governed_."

_Junius._

"The House of Commons are only interpreters whose
duty it is to convey the sense of the people
faithfully to the crown; if the interpretation be
false or imperfect, the constituent powers are
called to deliver their own sentiments. Their
speech is rude but intelligible; their gestures
fierce but full of explanation. Perplexed with
sophistries, their honest eloquence rises into
action."--Let. 38.

"I am convinced that if shortening the duration of
parliaments (which, in effect, is keeping the
representative under the rod of the constituent)
be not made the basis of our new parliamentary
jurisprudence, other checks or improvements
signify nothing. On the contrary, if this be made
the foundation, other measures may come in aid,
and, as auxiliaries, be of considerable advantage.
If we are sincere in the political creed we
profess, there are many things can not be done by
king, lords and commons."--Let. 68.

"Here, then, is the origin and rise of government;
viz, a mode rendered necessary by the inability of
moral virtue to govern the world; here, too, is
the design and end of government, viz: freedom and
security. And however our eyes may be dazzled with
show, or our ears deceived by sound; however
prejudice m