rporated
in the Roman public domain, and the right to occupy or exploit them was
leased to individuals or companies of contractors. Customs dues
(_portoria_) were also collected in the harbors and on the frontiers of
the provinces.

*The tax collectors.* Following the custom established in Italy, the Roman
state did not collect its taxes in the provinces through public officials
but leased for a period of five years the right to collect each particular
tax to the private corporation of tax collectors (_publicani_) which made
the highest bid for the privilege. These corporations were joint stock
companies, with a central office at Rome and agencies in the provinces in
which they were interested. It was this system which was responsible for
the greatest evils of Roman provincial administration. For the _publicani_
were usually corporations of Romans, bent on making a profit from their
speculation, and practised under the guise of raising the revenue, all
manner of extortion upon the provincials. It was the duty of the governor
to check their rapacity, but from want of sympathy with the oppressed and
unwillingness to offend the Roman business interests this duty was rarely
performed. Hand in hand with tax collecting went the business of money
lending, for the Romans found a state of chronic bankruptcy prevailing in
the Greek world and made loans everywhere at exorbitant rates of interest.
To collect overdue payments the Roman bankers appealed to the governor,
who usually quartered troops upon delinquent communities until they
satisfied their creditors.

*The rapacity of the governors.* A further source of misgovernment lay in
the greed of the governor and his staff. The temptations of unrestricted
power proved too great for the morality of the average Roman. It is true
that there were not wanting Roman governors who maintained the highest
traditions of Roman integrity in public office, but there were also only
too many who abused their power to enrich themselves. While the shortness
of his term of office prevented a good governor from thoroughly
understanding the conditions of his province, it served to augment the
criminal zeal with which an avaricious proconsul, often heavily indebted
from the expenses of his election campaigns, sought to wring a fortune
from the hapless provincials. Bribes, presents, illegal exactions, and
open confiscations were the chief means of amassing wealth. In this the
almost sovereign position