nion of the public, as will
be seen by the following short extract, dated 26th September, &c.

I am anxious to hear what will be said of the occurrences here,
although I am conscious of having acted for the good of my
country to the utmost in my power; and I trust the whole of my
conduct since my first coming upon the station will be
entirely approved of by government: it is very possible there
may be those who will be disposed to find fault, however
unjustly.

It will be seen hereafter, that this apprehension was not ill-founded.

Before the arrival of the Victory and squadron off Rogerwick, Sir
Samuel Hood had despatched his first lieutenant with the intelligence
of the capture and destruction of the Russian seventy-four, Sewolod,
and of the position of the Russian fleet. This officer was, of course,
the bearer of many letters, which described the enemy's ships to be in
a situation easily to be attacked, when the commander-in-chief should
arrive. The expectations of the nation, from the known prowess of Sir
James Saumarez, were therefore raised to the highest pitch. When the
information subsequently reached England that he had not attacked
them, it is not to be wondered at that blame should be attached to him
by the public, who could not be aware of the existence of those
circumstances which frustrated his intentions; and so long did this
impression last, that it was only in 1834 that the Author explained
the causes to his late Majesty, who had always been impressed with the
idea that it was Sir James, and not the Swedish Admiral and Sir Samuel
Hood, that objected to the attack; though certainly the very reverse
was the fact. There can be no doubt that, if Sir James had been
authorised to take command of the Swedish fleet, he would, even
against the opinion of Sir Samuel, have attacked the enemy's fleet on
the 31st of August; and, as the wind changed on the following morning,
he would have been able to carry off all his prizes without any
difficulty. We have ever since lamented that the attempt, as planned
by Sir James, was not promptly made.

The official description of the action with the Russian fleet will be
found in the Appendix; as also Sir James's correspondence with his
Swedish Majesty on the subject.

As it was hoped that some shift of wind would enable us to attack the
enemy, we remained in a state of anxiety for three weeks. In the
interim, intelligence was received