FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   161   162   163   164   165   166   167   168   169   170   171   172   173   174   175   176   177   178   179   180   181   182   183   184   185  
186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210   >>   >|  
o, however, with an enemy that was not only powerful, but wily and unscrupulous; one whose action would be governed wholly by considerations of interest and expediency, not by those of right. Great Britain could not, probably, keep the French out of Naples, but she could out of Sicily, provided, and only provided, Messina was adequately garrisoned and held. If, however, there was any hasty overt action taken, looking to the security of Sicily, it might merely precipitate the seizure of Naples and the entire conquest of the King's continental dominions; or, "ten times more humiliating," leave him "an odious commissary to raise contributions from his unhappy subjects for the French." On the other hand, if, to avert suspicion, there was too much slackness in the measures to guard Sicily, Messina might be suddenly seized, the gates of the island thus thrown open, and, Sicily once lost, "_Naples falls of course_." "It is a most important point," he wrote to Elliot soon after, "to decide when Sicily ought to be placed in a state of security. For the present, I am content to say that Messina need not be taken possession of; but the strictest watch must be kept by Sir John Acton that we are not lulled into a fatal security, and thus lose both Kingdoms. To save for the moment Naples, we risk the two Kingdoms, and General Acton must join me in this heavy responsibility." "My whole opinion rests in these few words--_that we must not risk Sicily too far in trying to save Naples; therefore, General Acton, yourself and myself must keep a good lookout_." This summed up the conditions for Naples during the long two years of watching and waiting, while Bonaparte, concentrating his purposes upon his invasion scheme, was content to leave things quiet in the South. To check, as far as might be, the designs of the French towards Morea or towards Sicily, on either side of the central position they held at the heel of Italy, Nelson employed a proportionately large number of cruisers--five--between Messina and the mouth of the Adriatic; while, to provide for the safety of the royal family, he kept always a ship-of-the-line in the Bay of Naples, the British minister holding orders for her captain to embark them at a moment's notice, and take them to Sicily. "I have kept everything here to save Italy, if in my power," he wrote Elliot two months later, "and you know I was ordered to send a squadron outside the Straits. Fourteen days ago, a Frenc
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   161   162   163   164   165   166   167   168   169   170   171   172   173   174   175   176   177   178   179   180   181   182   183   184   185  
186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

Sicily

 

Naples

 

Messina

 

French

 

security

 

moment

 

General

 

Kingdoms

 

action

 

content


Elliot

 

provided

 

summed

 
conditions
 

watching

 

ordered

 
invasion
 
scheme
 

things

 

purposes


Bonaparte

 

concentrating

 
waiting
 

Straits

 

responsibility

 

Fourteen

 

opinion

 

squadron

 

lookout

 

family


Adriatic

 

provide

 

safety

 

embark

 

notice

 

captain

 

British

 

minister

 

holding

 

orders


central

 

position

 

designs

 
months
 

proportionately

 

number

 

cruisers

 

employed

 
Nelson
 
humiliating