y man's experience, whether the visible
extension of any object doth not appear as near to him as the colour of
that object; nay, whether they do not both seem to be in the very same
place. Is not the extension we see coloured, and is it possible for us,
so much as in thought, to separate and abstract colour from extension?
Now, where the extension is there surely is the figure, and there the
motion too. I speak of those which are perceived by sight.

44. But for a fuller explication of this point, and to show that the
immediate objects of sight are not so much as the ideas or resemblances
of things placed at a distance, it is requisite that we look nearer into
the matter and carefully observe what is meant in common discourse, when
one says that which he sees is at a distance from him. Suppose, for
example, that looking at the moon I should say it were fifty or sixty
semidiameters of the earth distant from me. Let us see what moon this is
spoken of: it is plain it cannot be the visible moon, or anything like
the visible moon, or that which I see, which is only a round, luminous
plane of about thirty visible points in diameter. For in case I am
carried from the place where I stand directly towards the moon, it is
manifest the object varies, still as I go on; and by the time that I am
advanced fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth, I shall be so far
from being near a small, round, luminous flat that I shall perceive
nothing like it; this object having long since disappeared, and if I
would recover it, it must be by going back to the earth from whence I set
out. Again, suppose I perceive by sight the faint and obscure idea of
something which I doubt whether it be a man, or a tree, or a tower, but
judge it to be at the distance of about a mile. It is plain I cannot mean
that what I see is a mile off, or that it is the image or likeness of
anything which is a mile off, since that every step I take towards it the
appearance alters, and from being obscure, small, and faint, grows clear,
large, and vigorous. And when I come to the mile's end, that which I saw
first is quite lost, neither do I find anything in the likeness of it.

45. In these and the like instances the truth of the matter stands thus:
having of a long time experienced certain ideas, perceivable by touch, as
distance, tangible figure, and solidity, to have been connected with
certain ideas of sight, I do upon perceiving these ideas of sight
forthwith conclu