e present time, Russia proper has
depended almost exclusively upon the Baltic ports. By special treaties
with the new Baltic states, Russia is assuring herself a continued use
of their ports. There is no reason why, if it should appear necessary
and advisable, a similar conciliatory agreement with Ukraine could not
arrange for a common use of the Black Sea ports.
With regard to Ukraine's coal resources, it is true that the Donetz
basin furnished 70% of the total coal output of the former Russian
empire, and the Donetz basin is mostly within the ethnographic limits
of Ukraine. But it is also a fact that four-fifths of this coal was
consumed in Ukraine itself, and that northwestern Russia and the Baltic
provinces never used the coal from the Donetz basin, because it could
not compete in price with English or German coal. Furthermore, northern
and central Russia are well supplied with wood and peat, and with coal
from the vicinity of Moscow. Ukraine has very little wood or peat, and
the exhaustion of the Donetz basin for the sake of Russian industries
would leave her without fuel resources. The Urals and Siberia, too, are
supplied with local coal, while in the Kuznetsky district in west
Siberia are vast deposits, scarcely worked as yet because of the lack
of railway lines into Siberia.
The iron fields of the Urals and of other provinces of Russia proper
have not been extensively exploited, and before the war Ukraine did
indeed furnish three-fourths of all the iron supply of the former
Russian empire. But the beds of iron ore in Ukraine are not very large,
and it would be erroneous to assume that they could adequately supply
the needs of all Russia for any long period of time. In any case, it is
safe to conclude that, if the metallurgical development of Russia is
continued and her mines consistently worked, she will be entirely able
to get along without iron imports from Ukraine.
Finally, there is no obstacle to permanent economic co-operation of
Ukraine and Russia, and brisk commercial dealings between the two
independent states. But political disentanglement is a first requisite.
The richness of Ukraine has always made it a tempting region for
exploitation by neighboring states. This is more than ever true today.
If such exploitation is not to be carried on at the expense of and to
the detriment of the Ukrainian people, a separate state organization is
necessary to assume protection over their economic interests.
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