inciple
is vitiated if both houses are chosen by the same electorate. The chief
executive should be chosen by the legislative chambers in joint session,
from a panel made up of their own membership and the heads of the county
and city governments. He should hold office for a long term, preferably
for an indeterminate period contingent on "good behaviour." In this case
his cabinet, or council of the heads of departments, would of course be
responsible to the legislature and would resign on a formal vote of
censure or "lack of confidence." The Governor would have the same power
of appointment, and the same authority to present fiscal and legislative
budgets as, already specified in the case of a mayor of a city. No
"commissions," unpaid or otherwise, should be permitted, all the
administrative functions of government being performed by the various
departments and their subordinate bureaux.

The national government is the final social and political unit, though
it is conceivable that with a territory and population as great and
diversified as that of the United States, and bearing in mind the great
discrepancy in size between the states, something might be gained by the
institution of a system of provinces, some five or six in all, made up
of states grouped in accordance with their general community of
interests, as for example, all New England, New York, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey and Delaware; the states of the old Confederacy, those of the
Pacific Coast, and so on. The point need not be pressed here, but there
are considerations in its favour. In any case the nation as a whole is
the final federal unit. Here the lower legislative house would consist
of not more than four hundred members, allocated on a basis of
population and elected by the representative bodies of the primary units
(the townships and city wards) as already described. The members of the
upper house would be elected by the legislative bodies of the several
states on nomination by the Governor. The chief executive of the nation
would be chosen by the two legislative bodies, in joint session, from
amongst the then governors of the several states. He should certainly
hold office for "good behaviour," and his cabinet would be responsible
to the legislature as provided for in the case of the state governments.

I do not offer this programme with any pride of paternity; probably it
would not work very well, but it could hardly prove less efficacious
than our pr