he Turks from troubling us in Mesopotamia and other
parts of the Near and Middle East. Hence the Treaty of Sevres, which
provided for the aggrandizement of Greece at the expense of the Ottoman
Empire in Asia as well as in Europe, to the seeming satisfaction of
both French and British interests. But the adjustment--even if it had
been forced upon Turkey--could, by the nature of things, be only
temporary. Owing to her geographical situation, Greece must inevitably
move within the orbit of the Power who dominates the sea.

Psychology accelerated a movement imposed by geography. While France
based her action upon an English humorist's paradox, England based hers
upon a French thinker's maxim: _Lorsqu'on veut redoubler de force, il
faut redoubles de grace_. Although her diplomatic, military, and naval
representatives did participate in every measure of coercion and
intimidation as a matter of policy, they (if we except the Secret
Service gentry) never forgot the dictates of decency: they never,
figuratively, kicked the person whom they deemed it necessary to knock
down. The ordinary British soldiers, too, for all the relaxation of
moral rules natural in war, maintained throughout the campaign a
standard of behaviour which contrasted so favourably with their
comrades' that it earned them among the inhabitants of Macedonia the
honourable nickname of "the maids." It was particularly noted during
the fire which devastated Salonica that, while others took advantage of
the turmoil to loot, the British soldier devoted himself wholly to
rescuing. Some of these things were perhaps resented by our allies as
weak, and some were ridiculed as naive; but they must be judged by
their effect. At the end of the War one nation was respected by the
Greeks as much as the other was hated and despised. British prestige
rose exactly in proportion as French prestige sank. And the object
which France elected to seek, and sought in vain, by {233} means of
violence and terror, England attained by a conduct which, if not more
lawful, was much more graceful.

Still, French statesmen counted on M. Venizelos--"_l'homme politique
qui incarne l'idee de la solidarite des interets francais et
grecs_"--to keep his country on their side. And as in the first
instance they had made the alliance conditional on his being placed in
control, so now they made the benefits accruing from it to Greece
dependent on his remaining in control. That M. Venizelo