e, 1913). Great
Britain, with voluntary service, still had a comparatively small army:
in size "contemptible," as Kaiser Wilhelm called it later, but in morale
and spirit unsurpassed. Evidently the military force of Germany, which
lay like a glittering sword in her ruler's hand, was larger, better
organized and equipped, than any other in the world.

But might it not still be used as a make-weight in the scales of
negotiation rather than as a weapon of actual offense? Might not the
Kaiser still be pleased with his dramatic role of "the war-lord who kept
the peace"? Might he not do again as he did successfully in 1909, when
Austria violated the provisions of the Congress of Berlin (1878) by
annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany protected the theft; and
with partial success at Algeciras in 1906, and after the Agadir incident
in 1911, when Germany gained something she wanted though less than she
claimed? Might he not still be content with showing and shaking the
sword, without fleshing it in the body of Europe? It seemed wiser,
because safer for Germany, that the Kaiser should follow that line. The
methodical madness of a forced war looked incredible.

Thus all of us who were interested in the continuance and solidification
of the work of the peace conferences at The Hague reasoned ourselves
into a peaceful hope. We knew that no other power except Germany was
really prepared for war. We knew that the effort to draw Great Britain
into an offensive and defensive alliance with Germany had failed,
although London was willing to promise help to Berlin if attacked. We
remembered Bismarck's warning that a war against Russia and Great
Britain at the same time would be fatal, and we trusted that it had not
been forgotten in Berlin. We knew that Germany, under her policy of
industrial development and pacific penetration, was prospering more than
ever, and we thought she might enjoy that enough to continue it. We
hoped that a third peace conference would be assembled before a general
conflict of arms could be launched, and that some things might be done
there which would make wilful and aggressive war vastly more dangerous
and difficult, if not impossible. So we were at ease in Zion and worked
in the way which seemed most promising for the peace of the world.

But that way was not included in the German plan. It was remote from the
Berlin-Baghdad-Bahn. It did not lead toward a dominant imperial state of
Mittel-Europa, with t