p to him, had them all
brought out, as it appeared, to make a show of them, and that Pompey
might place a greater confidence in him who was a deserter; and calling
them fellow soldiers, and asking them in the most insulting manner
whether it was usual with veterans to flee, ordered them to be put to
death in the sight of the whole army.

LXXII.-Pompey's party were so elated with confidence and spirit at this
success, that they thought no more of the method of conducting the war,
but thought that they were already conquerors. They did not consider
that the smallness of our numbers, and the disadvantage of the place and
the confined nature of the ground occasioned by their having first
possessed themselves of the camp, and the double danger both from within
and without the fortifications, and the separation of the army into two
parts, so that the one could not give relief to the other, were the
cause of our defeat. They did not consider, in addition, that the
contest was not decided by a vigorous attack, nor a regular battle; and
that our men had suffered greater loss from their numbers and want of
room, than they had sustained from the enemy. In fine, they did not
reflect on the common casualties of war; how trifling causes, either
from groundless suspicions, sudden affright, or religious scruples, have
oftentimes been productive of considerable losses; how often an army has
been unsuccessful either by the misconduct of the general, or the
oversight of a tribune; but as if they had proved victorious by their
valour, and as if no change could ever take place, they published the
success of the day throughout the world by reports and letters.

LXXIII.--Caesar, disappointed in his first intentions, resolved to
change the whole plan of his operations. Accordingly, he at once called
in all out-posts, gave over the siege, and collecting his army into one
place, addressed his soldiers and encouraged them "not to be troubled at
what had happened, nor to be dismayed at it, but to weigh their many
successful engagements against one disappointment, and that, too, a
trifling one. That they ought to be grateful to Fortune, through whose
favour they had recovered Italy without the effusion of blood; through
whose favour they had subdued the two Spains, though protected by a most
warlike people under the command of the most skilful and experienced
generals: through whose favour they had reduced to submission the
neighbouring states tha