the Mexicans did
not land troops to annoy us in our camp, and, if possible, to entice us
into places where we should be unable to act, and they could attack us
to greater advantage.

Sandoval, as we have seen, left Tezcuco with his division four days
after the feast of Corpus Christi, and marched towards Iztapalapan. His
route lay through townships which were either subject to, or in alliance
with Tezcuco. As soon as he arrived at Iztapalapan, he commenced his
military operations by burning down the greater portion of the houses
which stood on the mainland.

It was not long before large bodies of Mexican troops arrived for the
protection of Iztapalapan, with whom Sandoval had a severe skirmish, and
drove them back again to their canoes; but still they continued to
shower their arrows and darts upon him, and wounded several of his men.

During this conflict a thick smoke was seen to rise from several signal
fires which had been lighted on the surrounding hills. This had been a
signal to call in all the canoes of Mexico and of the other towns
situated on the lake, as Cortes had just run out from Tezcuco with the
thirteen brigantines.

The first attack our general made with this fleet was against a rocky
height on an island near Mexico. This place had been strongly fortified,
and was garrisoned by a great number of Mexicans and inhabitants of
other townships. All the canoes of Mexico, Xochimilco, Cojohuacan,
Huitzilopuzco, Iztapalapan, and Mexicalzinco, had united in a body to
oppose Cortes, which was the reason why the attack was carried on with
so little vigour against Sandoval, who, however, was not able to do the
enemy much damage, as most of the houses stood in the water; though, in
the commencement of the attack, our allies had made many prisoners. In
Iztapalapan, Saudoval found himself on a peninsula in the lake, and the
only way by which he could reach Cojohuacan was by a causeway which ran
half way through the lake, on which he would have been assailed from
both sides by the enemy, without his being able to defend himself with
much advantage.

When Cortes observed the vast number of canoes which kept continually
crowding around the brigantines, he began to feel alarmed, and this not
without reason, for their number amounted to above 4000. He therefore
abandoned his attack upon the rock, and selected a position with his
brigantines, where he would be able to observe all the enemy's
movements, and steer off in