all upon our rear. We therefore determined to retreat
back along the causeway, for which purpose we ordered the Tlascallans to
move off first, that we might effect our retreat in perfect good order.
Here the Tlascallans had greatly embarrassed us in our movements, who,
it is well known, never can fight standing in the water.

The instant the Mexicans perceived we were turning back, and saw the
Tlascallans moving off the causeway, they set up most distracting yells,
and attacked us man to man with great fierceness. It is indeed out of my
power to describe it. The whole of the causeway was instantly covered
with lances, arrows, and stones, besides that vast quantities fell into
the water. When we had again reached the mainland, we returned fervent
thanks to the Almighty for having rescued us from this severe battle.

Eight of our men were killed and fifty wounded: added to all this, we
were obliged to put up with the hootings and jeers of the enemy, who
kept calling upon the Tlascallans to come with double their numbers next
time, and they would very soon settle their impudence. Our first deeds
of arms, therefore, merely consisted in destroying the aqueduct of
Chapultepec, and in reconnoitring the lake along the causeway, in which
we did not exactly reap much honour.

For the rest, we passed the following night very quietly in our
quarters, posted our sentinels, and dressed our wounds. One of our
horses was so severely wounded that it died soon after.

The following morning Oli determined upon taking up the position
assigned to his division at Cojohuacan, about six miles further on; and
however Alvarado and the other cavaliers might beg of him not to
separate the two divisions, yet he would not alter his determination.
Christobal de Oli was a man of uncommon bravery, whose pride was wounded
at the unsuccessful attempt we had made upon the causeway, and he
accused Alvarado of inconsiderateness for having ordered the attack.
Nothing, therefore, could induce him to stay, and he marched off with
his men to Cojohuacan.

The separation of the two divisions was very impolitic at this juncture;
for if the Mexicans had been aware of the smallness of our numbers, and
had attacked either of the divisions during the five following days,
before the brigantines had arrived, we should with difficulty have
escaped destruction. Both divisions, therefore, remained as quiet as the
enemy would allow them, though not a day passed by that