ive. Space is not a form of things, but a form
imposed upon the data of experience by the mind itself. This, as Kant
says, supposes a revolution in philosophy comparable to the revolution
made by Copernicus in astronomy. We have completely to invert our whole
system of conceiving the world. Whatever the value of Kant's doctrine,
of which I need here say nothing, it was undoubtedly more prolific than
Reid's. Reid's was far less thoroughgoing. He does not draw a new line
between object and subject, but simply endeavours to show that the
dilemma was due to certain assumptions about the nature of 'ideas.'

The real had been altogether separated from the phenomenal, or truth
divorced from fact. You can only have demonstrations by getting into a
region beyond the sensible world; while within that world--that is, the
region of ordinary knowledge and conduct--you are doomed to hopeless
uncertainty. An escape, therefore, must be sought by some thorough
revision of the assumed relation, but not by falling back upon the
exploded philosophy of the schools. Reid and his successors were quite
as much alive as Locke to the danger of falling into mere scholastic
logomachy. They, too, will in some sense base all knowledge upon
experience. Reid constantly appeals to the authority of Bacon, whom he
regards as the true founder of inductive science. The great success of
Bacon's method in the physical sciences, encouraged the hope, already
expressed by Newton, that a similar result might be achieved in 'moral
philosophy.'[164] Hume had done something to clear the way, but Reid
was, as Stewart thinks, the first to perceive clearly and justly the
'analogy between these two different branches of human knowledge.' The
mind and matter are two co-ordinate things, whose properties are to be
investigated by similar methods. Philosophy thus means essentially
psychology. The two inquiries are two 'branches' of inductive science,
and the problem is to discover by a perfectly impartial examination what
are the 'fundamental laws of mind' revealed by an accurate analysis of
the various processes of thought. The main result of Reid's
investigations is given most pointedly in his early _Inquiry_, and was
fully accepted by Stewart. Briefly it comes to this. No one can doubt
that we believe, as a fact, in an external world. We believe that there
are sun and moon, stones, sticks, and human bodies. This belief is
accepted by the sceptic as well as by the dogmati