and
entirely accepts therefore the theory of 'final causes.' The same theory
becomes prominent in his ethical teaching. We may perhaps say that
Stewart's view is in substance an inverted Utilitarianism. It may be
best illustrated by an argument familiar in another application. Paley
and his opponents might agree that the various instincts of an animal
are so constituted that in point of fact they contribute to his
preservation and his happiness. But from one point of view this appears
to be simply to say that the conditions of existence necessitate a
certain harmony, and that the harmony is therefore to be a consequence
of his self-preservation. From the opposite point of view, which Stewart
accepts, it appears that the self-preservation is the consequence of a
pre-established harmony, which has been divinely appointed in order that
he may live. Stewart, in short, is a 'teleologist' of the Paley variety.
Psychology proves the existence of design in the moral world, as anatomy
or physiology proves it in the physical.

Stewart therefore fully agrees that virtue generally produces happiness.
If it be true (a doctrine, he thinks, beyond our competence to decide)
that 'the sole principle of action in the Deity' is benevolence, it may
be that he has commanded us to be virtuous because he sees virtue to be
useful. In this case utility may be the final cause of morality; and the
fact that virtue has this tendency gives the plausibility to utilitarian
systems.[195] But the key to the difficulty is the distinction between
'final' and 'efficient' causes; for the efficient cause of morality is
not the desire for happiness, but a primitive and simple instinct,
namely, the moral faculty.

Thus he rejects Paley's notorious doctrine that virtue differs from
prudence only in regarding the consequences in another world instead of
consequences in this.[196] Reward and punishment 'presuppose the notions
of right and wrong' and cannot be the source of those notions. The
favourite doctrine of association, by which the Utilitarians explained
unselfishness, is only admissible as accounting for modifications, such
as are due to education and example, but 'presupposes the existence of
certain principles which are common to all mankind.' The evidence of
such principles is established by a long and discursive psychological
discussion. It is enough to say that he admits two rational principles,
'self-love' and the 'moral faculty,' the coincidence