s,
into the hands of a lad necessarily destitute of experience, and often
little better than a fool. It is an insult to every man of years, of
character, and of talents, in a country. The moment we begin to reason
upon the hereditary system, it falls into derision; let but a single
idea begin, and a thousand will soon follow. Insignificance, imbecility,
childhood, dotage, want of moral character; in fine, every defect
serious or laughable unite to hold up the hereditary system as a figure
of ridicule. Leaving, however, the ridiculousness of the thing to the
reflections of the reader, I proceed to the more important part of the
question, namely, whether such a system has a right to exist.

To be satisfied of the right of a thing to exist, we must be satisfied
that it had a right to begin. If it had not a right to begin, it has not
a right to continue. By what right then did the hereditary system begin?
Let a man but ask himself this question, and he will find that he cannot
satisfy himself with an answer.

The right which any man or any family had to set itself up at first to
govern a nation, and to establish itself hereditarily, was no other than
the right which Robespierre had to do the same thing in France. If he
had none, they had none. If they had any, he had as much; for it is
impossible to discover superiority of right in any family, by virtue of
which hereditary government could begin. The Capets, the Guelphs,
the Robespierres, the Marats, are all on the same standing as to the
question of right. It belongs exclusively to none.

It is one step towards liberty, to perceive that hereditary government
could not begin as an exclusive right in any family. The next point
will be, whether, having once begun, it could grow into a right by the
influence of time.

This would be supposing an absurdity; for either it is putting time in
the place of principle, or making it superior to principle; whereas time
has no more connection with, or influence upon principle, than principle
has upon time. The wrong which began a thousand years ago, is as much a
wrong as if it began to-day; and the right which originates to-day, is
as much a right as if it had the sanction of a thousand years. Time with
respect to principles is an eternal now: it has no operation upon them:
it changes nothing of their nature and qualities. But what have we to
do with a thousand years? Our life-time is but a short portion of that
period, and if we fin