ouncil of
war, in which the former, who was senior, declared that his
instructions forbade his undertaking anything without the consent of
the kings of Spain and Portugal. This was indeed tying the hands of
the sea powers; but Rooke at last, chafing at the humiliating
inaction, and ashamed to go home without doing something, decided to
attack Gibraltar for three reasons: because he heard it was
insufficiently garrisoned, because it was of infinite importance as a
port for the present war, and because its capture would reflect credit
on the queen's arms. The place was attacked, bombarded, and then
carried by an assault in boats. The English possession of Gibraltar
dates from August 4, 1704, and the deed rightly keeps alive the name
of Rooke, to whose judgment and fearlessness of responsibility England
owes the key of the Mediterranean.

The Bourbon king of Spain at once undertook to retake the place, and
called upon the French fleet in Toulon to support his attack.
Tourville had died in 1701, and the fleet was commanded by the Count
of Toulouse,--a natural son of Louis XIV., only twenty-six years old.
Rooke also sailed eastward, and the two fleets met on the 24th of
August off Velez Malaga. The allies were to windward with a northeast
wind, both fleets on the port tack heading to the southward and
eastward. There is some uncertainty as to the numbers; the French had
fifty-two ships-of-the-line, their enemy probably half a dozen more.
The allies kept away together, each ship for its opposite; there was
apparently no attempt on Rooke's part at any tactical combination. The
battle of Malaga possesses indeed no military interest, except that it
is the first in which we find fully developed that wholly unscientific
method of attack by the English which Clerk criticised, and which
prevailed throughout the century. It is instructive to notice that the
result in it was the same as in all others fought on the same
principle. The van opened out from the centre, leaving quite an
interval; and the attempt made to penetrate this gap and isolate the
van was the only tactical move of the French. We find in them at
Malaga no trace of the cautious, skilful tactics which Clerk rightly
thought to recognize at a later day. The degeneracy from the able
combinations of Monk, Ruyter, and Tourville to the epoch of mere
seamanship is clearly marked by the battle of Malaga, and gives it its
only historical importance. In it was realized that pri