s authority. But if it be argued,
assuming it as Ireland's case, that a usurped authority, gradually
acquiesced in by the people, ultimately becomes the same as legitimate,
the reply is still clear. For ourselves we meet the assumption with a
simple denial, appealing to Irish History for evidence that we never
acquiesced in the English Usurpation. But to those who are not satisfied
with this simple denial, we can point out that even an authority,
originally founded legitimately, may be resisted when abusing its power
to the ruin of the Commonwealth. We still stand on the ground that the
English government is founded in usurpation, but we can dispose of all
objections by proving the extremer case. This is the case Dr. Murray,
already quoted, discusses. "The question," he writes, "is about
resistance to an established and legitimate government which abuses its
power." (_Essays, Chiefly Theological_, Vol. 4.) He continues: "The
common opinion of a large number of our theologians, then, is that it is
lawful to resist by force, and if necessary to depose, the sovereign
ruler or rulers, in the extreme--the very extreme--case wherein the
following conditions are found united:

"1. The tyranny must be excessive--intolerable.

"2. The tyranny must be manifest, manifest to men of good sense and
right feeling.

"3. The evils inflicted by the tyrant must be greater than those which
would ensue from resisting and deposing him.

"4. There must be no other available way of getting rid of the tyranny
except by recurring to the extreme course.

"5. There must be a moral certainty of success.

"6. The revolution must be one conducted or approved by the community
at large ... the refusal of a small party in the State to join with
the overwhelming mass of their countrymen would not render the
resistance of the latter unlawful." (_Essays, Chiefly Theological_;
see also Rickaby, _Moral Philosophy_, Chap. 8, Sec. 7.)

Some of these conditions are drawn out at much length by Dr. Murray. I
give what is outstanding. How easily they could fit Irish conditions
must strike anyone. I think it might fairly be said that our leaders
generally would, if asked to lay down conditions for a rising, have
framed some more stringent than these. It might be said, in truth, of
some of them that they seem to wait for more than a moral certainty of
success, an absolute certainty, that can never be looked for in war.

IV