ter, but who now seemed to
have little stomach for a fight against their former friends. The whole
of the Carlist cavalry, even then not very numerous, was also there. The
grim-visaged priest Merino, ever the stanchest partisan of absolutism,
bestrode his famous black horse, and headed a body of lancers as fierce
and wild-looking as himself; Pascual Real, the dashing major of
Ferdinand's guard, who in former days, when he took his afternoon ride
in the Madrid prado, drew all eyes upon him by the elegance of his
horsemanship, marshalled the Alavese hussars; and, in a third place,
some squadrons of Navarrese, who had left the fat pastures of the valley
of Echauri to be present at the expected fight, were ranged under the
orders of the young and gallant Manolin.

But whoever had the opportunity of observing the Carlist army on that
day and a month previously, saw a mighty difference in the spirit
pervading it. He who had been its soul, whose prestige gave confidence
to the soldier, and whose acknowledged superiority of talent prevented
rivalry amongst the chiefs, was now no more; his death had been followed
by a reverse, the only really serious one the Carlists had yet
encountered, and dissension was already springing up amongst the
followers of the Pretender. Intrigue was at work, rival interests were
brought into play; there was no longer amongst the officers that unity
of purpose which alone could have given the cause a chance of success;
nor amongst the men that unbounded confidence in their leader, which on
so many occasions had rendered them invincible. The spring of '35 had
been a season of triumph for the Carlists; the summer was to be one of
disasters.

Subsequent events sufficiently proved that Cordova was not the man to
command an army. Diplomacy was his forte; and he might also, as a
general, claim some merit for combinations in the cabinet. It was during
his command that the plan was formed for enclosing the Carlists within
certain fortified limits, in hopes that they would exhaust the resources
of the country, and with a view to preserve other provinces from the
contagion of Carlism.[3] Great credit was given him for this scheme,
which was carried out after many severe fights, and at great expense of
life; but neither of the advantages expected from it was ever realized.
In the field, Cordova was not efficient; he lacked resource and
promptitude; and the command of a division was the very utmost to which
hi