f, as it
appears in ourselves and others; and we use the term "common sense,"
merely because at present we cannot find one more appropriate, or which
would suit our purpose so well. If this name shall be found proper for
it, it is well;--but if not, we leave it to others to provide a better.

We have said, that Nature prompts to the use of knowledge by means of
two distinct principles; the one, which may be denominated the "Animal,"
or "Common Sense," refers to actions of which _we ourselves_ are the
subjects; and the other, known by the term of the "Moral Sense," or
conscience, refers to actions of which _others_ are the subjects. It is
the former of these that we are at present to investigate.

We must all have observed the promptness with which we avoid any sudden
danger, or inconvenience, before we have time to reason about the
matter. As, for example, when we stumble, we instantly put forth the
proper foot to prevent our fall. This cannot be said to be an act of the
reasoning powers, because they have not had time to operate; and it is
equally clear that it is not an act of instinct, because infants, who
have only begun to walk have not the capacity of doing it. It is
evidently another principle which, availing itself of the knowledge
which the person has previously acquired by experience, now uses it
specially for the occasion.

That this application of our knowledge arises neither from instinct nor
from reason, will be obvious from many circumstances of ordinary
occurrence.--For example, when any object approaches the eye we
instantly shut it;--when any missile is thrown at us, we instantly turn
the head aside to evade it;--or when in walking something destroys our
equilibrium and we stumble, we instantly bend the body in the proper
direction, and to the precise point, necessary to restore our balance,
and to prevent our fall.--Now it is obvious, that all these
contingencies are provided for by one and the same principle, whatever
that principle may be; and that they are acts which do not depend upon
instinct, properly so called, is proved from the circumstance, that
infants, before they are taught by experience that the eye is so tender,
and even adults who have but newly acquired the use of their sight,
neither shut their eyes at the approach of objects, nor turn away their
heads when a missile is thrown at them.--And we think it is equally
clear, that it cannot be the result of reasoning, in the sense in whi