o approve or
condemn the conduct of others, as well as our own; and this is
regulated, not by strict truth, but by our belief at the time, whether
that belief be correct or the contrary. Now the precept, "Thou shalt not
kill," would be sufficient to make the executive powers of conscience
watchful, in deterring the individual from the crime, or in reproving
and punishing him if he committed it. But the mere precept would have
but little effect in exhibiting to him the full atrocity of the sin, in
comparison with an anecdote or a story which detailed its commission.
But even this would not be so powerful as the effect produced by a
murder committed in a neighbouring street, and still more were it
perpetrated in his own presence. The necessary inference to be drawn
from this remarkable fact is, that moral truth is much more effectively
taught by example than by precept; and accordingly we find, that at
least four-fifths of scripture, which is altogether a moral instrument,
consist of narrative, and are given specially, "that the man of God may
be perfect, thoroughly furnished to every good work."
9. Another circumstance worthy of observation is, that the executive
powers of conscience appear to be exceedingly partial when exercised
upon actions done by _ourselves_, in comparison of its decisions upon
the same actions when they are committed by _others_.--When we ourselves
perform a good action, the approval of our conscience is more lively and
more extensive, than it would have been had the good action been that of
another. On the contrary, it would be more ready to perform its
functions, and more powerful in impressing upon our minds the demerit or
wickedness of an action committed by another, than if we ourselves had
committed it. The reason of this is obviously self-love, which partly
overbears the natural operations of this principle. Violence of passion
and strong desire, when we are tempted to commit a crime, are hostile
movements against the dictates of conscience; and they too frequently,
by their excess, stifle and drown the still small voice which does
speak out, but which, for the moment, is not heard within us.--But
nothing of this kind takes place when the crime is committed by others.
We are then much more impartial; and conscience is permitted to utter
her voice, and to make her impressions without opposition. This
impartial decision on the conduct of others, is found to be a great
means of preventing us f
|