of Godoy's sister-in-law,
demand that of a Beauharnais princess, and thus secure the interest
and aid of the French emperor. With such support they might hope to
overthrow the minister and reform the administration. No doubt they
also dreamed of power and place for themselves.

As time passed, the sympathies of the nation rallied more and more to
Ferdinand, until at last he became the leader and representative of
the solid elements in society. Between the waning power of Godoy and
the rising popularity of the crown prince, something like an
equilibrium was at last established, and in 1807 the two embittered
factions stood like gladiators looking for a chance to strike. This
situation was made to Napoleon's hand; but as it gave rise to more and
more serious intrigues, a decision had to be taken promptly. Should he
accede to Ferdinand's desire, formally communicated in a letter sent
by Escoiquiz on October twelfth? Talleyrand and Fouche both urged the
adoption of the policy. What prompted Talleyrand cannot be surmised.
After Austerlitz he had urged moderation, but it was probably because
he was bribed by the vanquished. His judgment and interest may,
however, have kept equal pace in that conclusion. He was most likely
influenced in this one by the Empress, whose position was becoming
desperate, for the Bonaparte family were now persistently and openly
urging a divorce. All Josephine's arts seemed unavailing against her
obdurate enemies, and her last hope was to obtain royal alliances for
her relatives, thus securing new support against those of the Emperor.
She had a charming niece, Mlle. Tascher de la Pagerie, to whom she was
ardently devoted; and to set on the throne of Spain one who was almost
a daughter would both gratify natural affection and fortify her own
position.

There is no indication, however, that Talleyrand's hand was crossed
this time, though again his judgment coincided with his interest in
sound advice. The country was utterly disorganized and a change must
occur; the people were too haughty to endure their humiliation longer;
it would be better to support Ferdinand as a reformer, and thereby
secure for the French system not merely the kingdom proper, but all
her colonial dominions. As Fouche put it, the King had so far been one
of the best of French prefects, and if he were no longer efficient his
legitimate heir had better be continued in the office. But the idea of
securing the Spanish colonies for